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Correspondence
Learning and Herding Using Case-Based Decisions
With Local Interactions
Andreas Krause
Abstract—We evaluate repeated decisions of individuals using a variant
of the case-based decision theory (CBDT), where individuals base their
decisions on their own past experience and the experience of neighboring
individuals. Looking at a range of scenarios to determine the successful
outcome of a decision, we find that for learning to occur, agents must have
a sufficient number of neighbors to learn from and access to sufficiently
independent information. If these conditions are not fulfilled, we can easily
observe herding in cases where no best decision exists.
Index Terms—Decision making, economics, simulation.
I. INTRODUCTION
When facing a decision in unfamiliar circumstances, people tend
to utilize their experiences from similar situations in the past. These
experiences can be derived from their own personal experiences or
those of other decision makers whose circumstances are well known
to them. The degree of similarity between the circumstances will obvi-
ously have to be taken into account when analyzing these experiences.
The idea of using past experiences to inform decision making
has formally been operationalized as the case-based decision theory
(CBDT) in a series of papers [1]–[8]. The CBDT has received some
attention in a number of applications in financial markets [9]–[11],
voting [12], production theory [13], and consumer theory [14], [15].
In contrast to these applications, not much notice has been given to
the dynamics of repeated decisions using the CBDT [16] or on how
decision makers learn from their experiences [17], apart from chapters
in [7].1
In this correspondence, we will explore both aspects, the dynamics
of decisions and whether decision makers learn the optimal decision
over time. To this end, we introduce a model implementing the
CBDT in Section II. Then, we determine different scenarios on how
successful outcomes of a decision are determined in Section III and
analyze the results of our computer experiments, which are described
in Section IV, in Section V. Section VI then concludes the findings.
II. CBDT ON A NETWORK
Let us denote by C the set of all possible circumstances. We can then
define a similarity function s as
s : C × C → [0; 1] (1)
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1Case-based reasoning, which is widely used in artificial intelligence, pro-
vides a broadly similar approach [18]. Our model here, however, differs in
that no previous cases are explicitly selected (we select all cases available to
the decision maker), and we do not revise cases but merely acknowledge the
outcome of the decision made.
where for any i, j ∈ C, s(i, j) = 1 can be interpreted as the two
circumstances being identical and s(i, j) = 0 as being completely
unrelated to each other.2 From this interpretation, it is obvious that
∀i ∈ C : s(i, i) = 1. A more extensive discussion of the way simi-
larities can be measured is given in [19], but for the purpose of this
correspondence, we can take the similarities as exogenously given.
Katsikopoulos and Fasolo [20] discuss multiattribute models, which
can also be interpreted as introducing a similarity function to aid
decision making. Our network is different from Bayesian networks as,
for example, used in [21], in that no Bayesian updating of believes is
conducted, but a rather more simplified approach to decision making
is taken, as we will see later in this correspondence.
A decision is a mapping from the set of circumstances into the set
of all possible decisions, which is denoted by D, i.e.,
d : C → D (2)
and we define an outcome function as
u : D → O. (3)
If we now assume that the similarity reduces over time with a constant
factor 0 < λ < 1, we can define the following value function for any
dt(i) ∈ D, where i ∈ C and t indicates the time of the decision:
V (dt(i)) =
M∑
τ=1
(
λτ
∑
j∈C
s(i, j)u (dt−τ (j))1 (dt−τ (j))
)
(4)
where 1(dt−τ (j)) denotes an indicator function, which is 1 if the two
decisions are equivalent, i.e., dt−τ (j) = dt(i), and 0 otherwise. In
every time step, the decision maker will choose the action that provides
him with the highest value function, i.e.,
d∗t ∈ arg max
dt∈D
V (dt(i)) . (5)
Using this formulation of the CBDT, we can now continue to define
a simplified setup that suits our needs. First, we can restrict the set of
decisions to D = {buy; sell} and let the possible outcomes be either
“failure” or “success,” such that O = {−1;+1}.
We can now interpret decision making as that of a number of agents
making repeated decisions on similar circumstances over time, where
the similarity is denoted by s(i, j) if agent j shares his experiences
with agent i, i.e., they are interacting with each other. If two agents
are not interacting with each other, they cannot learn from their
experiences, i.e., s(i, j) = 0. For those instances where agents are
interacting, we find that s(i, j) > 0. We allow for the case where the
interactions are asymmetric, i.e., in general, we find that s(i, j) =
s(j, i).
Using this interpretation, we can construct a matrix S = [s(i, j)]
capturing all the interactions between agents. This matrix can be
understood as an adjacency matrix of a graph representing the network
of interactions between agents. We can create a random network
of interactions by determining a positive entry in the matrix with
2We could also define s : C × C → [−1; 1], where negative similarities
would indicate that the two circumstances are opposite to each other. This sim-
ple extension does not change the arguments presented in this correspondence.
1083-4427/$25.00 © 2009 IEEE
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probability p, and the entry itself is randomly taken from a uniform
distribution on the interval [0; 1].
It has to be stressed that the CBDT as used in this correspondence
deviates from the conventional approach. In the original model, agents
only learn from their own past behavior, whereas we also allow
learning from the behavior of other agents. While such behavior is
realistic in many circumstances, it changes the dynamics of the system
investigated. The experience of other agents will easily dominate an
agent’s own experience, even for relatively small p. While such a setup
seems not to have been intended when introducing the CBDT, it is a
natural extension of that framework.
We can now use the model presented here to evaluate the evo-
lution of aggregate decisions over time, as well as learning of the
best decision over time. Using different rules on how the successful
outcome is determined, we can compare our results for a variety of
scenarios.
III. DETERMINATION OF SUCCESSFUL OUTCOMES
We consider seven different scenarios on how the successful out-
come is determined. For each scenario, we define a benchmark out-
come that would be the optimal behavior of agents. Apart from the
minority outcomes, the chosen benchmarks would also be the outcome
of a Bayesian learning process.
In the first scenario, we assume that the successful outcome is ran-
domly determined with equal probability and independently for each
agent, as well as across time periods (independent fair outcomes).
Hence, in this scenario, there is no real value in the experience of other
agents or the past. Here, no best strategy exists, and any strategy of
agents should be equivalent. As a benchmark in this case, we can use a
scenario in which all agents behave randomly and compare the results
to this benchmark case.
The second scenario is very similar to the first scenario except that
the probability of “buy” being the successful decision is set at 75%
(independent biased outcomes). Hence, all agents should always seek
to choose “buy” as this would give them the best chances of success.
The third scenario is also similar to the first scenario; however, here,
the successful outcome is identical for all agents in a given time period
(identical fair outcomes). However, it remains independently across
time periods, and the probabilities for either decision being successful
is still 50%. In this case again, the past experience of other agents has
no value, and agents can follow any strategy. Thus, the benchmark in
this case would be the same as in scenario 1, i.e., all agents behave
randomly.
The fourth scenario is based on the third scenario, and similarly
to scenario 2, the probability of success for the strategy “buy” is set
at 75% (identical biased outcomes). Thus, similarly to that case, all
agents should always choose “buy.”
The fifth scenario assumes a correlation between the successful
outcomes across agents but, again, no correlation across time periods,
and the ex ante probability of success is equal for all strategies
(correlated fair outcomes). The correlation between the successful
outcomes is determined by the adjacency matrix of the interactions,
i.e., S.3 Similarly to scenarios 1 and 3, no information can be gained
from the past experience of agents, and the appropriate benchmark is
again the random choice of strategy by agents.
The sixth scenario endogenously determines the successful outcome
as the minority outcome, i.e., the decision that has been chosen
by the least number of agents is the successful outcome (minority
3It has to be noted that the adjacency matrix does not need to be positive def-
inite as required for a correlation matrix. This problem is not further addressed
in this correspondence but does not affect the outcome of our analysis.
TABLE I
VARIABLES FOR THE BENCHMARK CASE
outcomes). Such a scenario has extensively been explored using the
minority game [22], where it has been applied to financial markets. In
this scenario, we can use the results from minority games and find that
a suitable benchmark would again be all agents behave randomly.
In the seventh and final scenario, the successful outcome is deter-
mined as the majority outcome, i.e., the decision that has been chosen
by the largest number of agents is the successful outcome (majority
outcomes). In this scenario, agents would ideally coordinate all their
decisions and then would always be successful. Thus, a good bench-
mark would be that all agents make the same decision, either buying
or selling.
The rationale behind choosing these scenarios was to evaluate cases
in which no optimal behavior exists (scenarios 1 and 3), as well as
scenarios in which it is present (scenarios 2 and 4). The scenarios
of independent outcomes (scenarios 1 and 2) and identical outcomes
(scenarios 3 and 4) will allow evaluating the influence that the infor-
mation structure has on the outcomes. An intermediate scenario in the
information structure (scenario 5) was also chosen to ensure that not
only extreme cases are looked at. Apart from exogenous outcomes
(scenarios 1–5), we also investigate cases in which the outcomes are
endogenously determined (scenarios 6 and 7). Due to the popularity
of the minority game in agent-based computational finance, we chose
this scenario (scenario 6) and its opposite, i.e., the majority outcome
(scenario 7), as a contrast, both requiring the coordination of the
choices of agents.
Using the aforementioned seven scenarios, we can now proceed to
set up the computer experiments, as described in the next section, and
evaluate the outcomes.
IV. COMPUTER EXPERIMENTS
We conduct Monte Carlo simulations of the aforementioned model
for a number of parameter constellations using fixed settings.
1) The memory length is fixed at M = 100, and we are investigat-
ing a system with N = 100 agents.
2) The adjacency matrix S is a random matrix where the entry is
nonzero with probability p and the nonzero entries are taken
from a uniform distribution on the interval [0; 1].
3) Each experiment uses a new randomly created adjacency matrix.
4) The remaining parameters are taken from the range p ∈ [0; 1]
and λ ∈ [0; 1].
5) The experiment is initialized with a random history of successes
and failure.
6) Each experiment consists of 11 000 time steps, of which the first
1000 are disregarded in the analysis.
7) For each parameter constellation, the presented results are ob-
tained from averaging the outcomes of 100 experiments.4
The parameter p controlling the number of nonzero entries in the
adjacency matrix can be interpreted as a measure of the number of
4The standard deviations across experiments for all parameters investigated
are very low, such that we can conclude that the results we derived are stable.
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TABLE II
OVERVIEW OF THE OUTCOME OF COMPUTER EXPERIMENTS
interactions between agents. Although we fixed the memory at M =
100, the discount factor λ can be used as a good proxy for the memory
length. With a low λ, past events only receive a very low impact on
decisions, thus corresponding to short memory, whereas a high value
of λ makes past events more relevant, thus corresponding to long
memory. We can therefore use λ as a measure for the memory length
of agents.
Using this setup, we will be investigating the three variables of
aggregate decision making.
1) Herding. The deviation from equally balanced buy and sell
decisions: H = |# agents buying− 50| ∈ [0; 50]. This variable
allows us to measure by how much agents’ decisions are biased
toward one of the decisions.
2) Length of herding. The number of time steps between changes
in the sign of (# agents buying− 50), i.e., the number of time
steps between a switch from a majority of agents buying to a
majority selling, or vice versa. This length will positively be
related to the autocorrelation of the number of agents buying.
Using this variable, we can identify how prolonged any bias is
until the decisions of the agents are reversed.
3) Volatility. The average absolute change between subsequent
time periods in the number of agents buying, i.e., the average
deviation from the mean number of agents buying. In contrast,
herding measures the average deviation from a fixed benchmark
of 50 agents buying. Using this volatility, it is possible to assess
how well agents are coordinating their decisions over time and
how persistent aggregate decisions are.
We can use these variables, averaged over the entire experiment, to
evaluate the experiments. If agents are learning over time, we should
observe the properties listed in Table I, which are derived from the
benchmark cases discussed in the previous section. The next section
will now analyze the actual outcomes of the experiments. All the
figures used depict these variables relative to the case of random
decision making, which has been normalized to unity for simplicity.
V. RESULTS OF THE EXPERIMENTS
In this section, we will explore the results of the computer exper-
iments as outlined in the previous sections. Apart from the general
observations of the resulting time series of aggregate outcomes, we
will particularly focus on the ability of agents to learn the best
decisions.
A. Some Observations
In this section, we will briefly characterize the main results that
we found from our computer experiments, as summarized in Table II.
From this table and Figs. 1–8, we first observe that in the case of biased
outcomes (scenarios 2 and 4) and majority outcomes (scenario 7)—
where an optimal strategy exists—agents only learn the optimal strat-
egy in the case of independent fair outcomes (scenario 2) once the
interactions are sufficiently high.5 The observed herding is such that
all agents are buying, i.e., they choose the optimal action whenever
significant herding is observed. In the other two scenarios, however,
agents never learn the optimal strategy and, on aggregate, behave like
they were making random decisions. In all other cases where there
is no best strategy, except for the case of independent fair outcomes
(scenario 1), agents tend to behave as if they make random decisions.
Only in scenario 1 do we observe extensive herding (for high interac-
tions), which is long lasting (for long memory).
We furthermore observe that herding tends to become more pro-
longed with increasing memory in those scenarios of independent and
correlated fair outcomes (scenarios 1 and 5) and a tendency to lower
volatility in those cases.
We clearly see from these results that the variant of the CBDT used
for the communications network, in general, does not lead to learning
the optimal behavior.6 In the case of the minority outcomes, it only
improves the coordination for agents with very long memory, and only
in the case of independent biased outcomes (scenario 2) do we observe
some learning of the best decision. This at first surprising result will
be explained in the next section.
B. Analysis of Computer Experiments
As previously shown, agents do not commonly learn the optimal
strategy; from the experiments conducted, together with the setup of
the model, we can deduct the reason for this result. For agents to learn,
they have to be able to adequately process information. It becomes
apparent from the case of independently biased outcomes (scenario 2)
that to learn, agents need a large number of interactions with other
5We found no evidence for a transition of the behavior of agents at the
emergence of a giant component p = 1/(N − 1) in the network. The apparent
change in behavior for minority and majority outcomes (scenarios 6 and 7) for
low p is not related to this transition; a closer analysis revealed that the change
in behavior does not occur at p = 1/99 but at higher values of p. We also
found no evidence for the behavior to change with the number of agents N . It
thus suggests that the transition observed here is independent of the percolation
threshold of the random graph.
6While we cannot exclude the possibility of a very slow learning process,
we found no evidence for it. Extending the analysis for a small number
of parameter constellations in various scenarios to 1 000 000 time steps and
analyzing only the final 10 000 observations did not show any significant
differences to the results reported here.
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Fig. 1. Results for independent fair outcomes (scenario 1).
agents, i.e., they use the experience of other agents, whereas memory
is of secondary significance for learning.7
The reason for this finding is that the additional independent ex-
perience provided by a sufficiently large number of agents provides
additional information, and agents will easily realize the better of
7To facilitate the comparative statics in this section, the reader might want
to consider a number of reference points, which can be chosen in the figures
provided.
1) p = 0: Here, agents are not interacting with each other, and thus, any
learning would only be based on their own experience.
2) p = 1: Agents learn from all other agents.
3) λ = 0: The absence of memory implies that no learning takes place,
4) λ = 1: Learning takes all past experiences into account at an equal rate.
Fig. 2. Results for independent biased outcomes (scenario 2).
the two strategies. Once the number of interactions is sufficiently
high, agents realize the optimal strategy and then consistently apply
it. We observe a sharp transition from the random strategy choice to
following the optimal strategy, providing evidence that the experience
is not gradually built in as it increases but shows a sharp phase
transition. Long memory in itself is not sufficient as the discounting
of past experience renders most earlier experience useless, not pro-
viding sufficient information for learning to take place, although it
affects the number of interactions required for the phase transition to
occur.
In the case of identical biased outcomes (scenario 4), we do not
observe any learning at all, even for a large number of interactions.
The reason for this finding is that the experience of other agents does
not provide any additional information for decision making as all
agents receive the same outcome. As we have seen from the case of
independent biased outcomes (scenario 2), only long memory is not
sufficient for learning to occur; thus, in this scenario, no learning is
observed, and agents behave randomly.
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Fig. 3. Contour plot of the results in Fig. 2.
These two findings seem to contradict the result in [14], which
would imply that for λ = 1 and p = 0, the agents should be learning
the optimal outcome. As we found no indication of an extremely
slow learning process that goes well beyond the 11 000 time periods
investigated, it suggests that this result is highly nonstable for even
small degrees of interactions and less than perfect memory. Further
investigations of the stability of the results in [14] seem appropriate in
light of our findings.
The same argument as in scenario 4 can be brought forward for the
majority outcomes (scenario 7). Here, we clearly see that the reason for
one strategy to dominate is irrelevant for the decision-making process.
Agents are not interested in the structure of the economy but only
the best outcomes, i.e., they do not attempt to learn the structure of
the economy. For this reason, there is no evidence for any difference
in the behavior between the identical biased and majority outcomes
(scenarios 4 and 7).
In the scenarios with fair outcomes (scenarios 1, 3, and 5), no best
strategy exists, and thus, we should not expect any learning. However,
in the scenarios with independent and correlated outcomes (scenarios 1
and 5), we observe some significant and long-lasting herding, whereas
this is not found for identical outcomes (scenario 3). The reason for this
observation is that while there does not exist an optimal solution, the
Fig. 4. Results for identical fair outcomes (scenario 3).
attempts by agents to find the best strategy will lead to the following
consequences: As the interactions increase, the agents become ever
more homogenous, thus relying on more and more similar information.
This arises from the fact that agents will have interactions with an
ever-increasing number of agents that are common to other agents,
too. If now, by pure coincidence arising from the random outcomes,
one strategy has performed better in the past, then an increasing
number of agents will choose this strategy, and the agents will tend
to choose this strategy. Given that they rely on the same information,
they will tend to make the same decision; thus, we obtain herding.
If the memory becomes long, any such performance remains in the
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Fig. 5. Results for identical biased outcomes (scenario 4).
system much longer, making decisions of agents identical over time.
This is caused by the fact that new information is only slowly replacing
old information, making any changes to the behavior of agents slow.
This process increases the length of herding and is clearly visible in the
case of independent fair outcomes (scenario 1) and, to a lesser degree,
also for correlated fair outcomes (scenario 5).
In the case of identical fair outcomes (scenario 3), we do not
observe any herding. Here, the reason is that the common outcome
does not allow for any strategy to obtain better performance, thus not
initializing any herding. The correlated fair outcomes (scenario 5) are
an intermediate stage between identical and independent fair outcomes
and thus show less herding than for independent outcomes, as would
be expected.
Finally, for minority outcomes (scenario 6), where an optimal strat-
egy also does not exist, we observe no herding. This can be explained
by the fact that the optimal strategy is endogenously determined, and
any advantage of a strategy will be eroded once herding emerges,
thus reversing the decisions of anyone following it. Therefore, we do
Fig. 6. Results for correlated fair outcomes (scenario 5).
not observe any herding, and long memory can actually increase the
coordination as agents tend to choose the same strategy over time, thus
increasing the number of agents being in the minority. The smaller
advantage of a strategy over its counterpart will avoid large swings
between agents’ choices.
C. Main Findings
Based on the aforementioned analysis of our computer experiments,
we can now derive some general conclusions. We could first establish
that with the variant of the CBDT used for communications networks,
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Fig. 7. Results for minority outcomes (scenario 6).
learning is driven by the interactions between agents, with memory
only accelerating this process but not being able to initiate learning.
However, for any learning to be able to take place, the experience
of other agents must convey some additional information, i.e., not
merely be equivalent to the agent’s own experience and be there-
fore sufficiently independent. This finding is very similar to the
requirements in statistical analysis, where a sufficient number (high
number of interactions) of independent (low correlation) observations
is required to be able to derive sound results.
Fig. 8. Results for majority outcomes (scenario 7).
This learning process is clearly defective, and in the absence of
any superior strategy, we can, depending on the structure of the
economy and the determination of outcomes, observe a significant
degree of prolonged herding that arises from the attempt to learn
the best strategy. This herding can lead to decisions biased toward
one or the other decision, thereby causing significant misallocations
in the economy. We may also observe the emergence of firmly
held beliefs in “what is the right way to do things,” which vanish
as fast as they appear, causing also significant distortions in the
economy.
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The origin of this result can be found in the aim of the agents. In
traditional models of economic decision making, agents attempt to
learn the structure of the economy and then use this information to
determine their optimal strategy. With our variant of the CBDT for
communications networks, in contrast, agents attempt to determine
the best strategy without learning the structure of the economy. In
the absence of a best strategy, the best strategy being too complex to
easily be identified, or the information processed not being sufficient
to identify the best strategy, we will observe either no learning or some
complex dynamics resulting from the (fruitless) search process.
It has to be noticed that any herding emerging from this process is
the result of an attempt to learn the best decision and not arising from
a simple model of imitation as is commonly assumed [23]–[26]. While
in these models imitation of the decision of others is merely the result
of a desire by agents to follow the majority, in our model, this forms
an essential part of the attempt to learn the best decision. Agents in
our model only make the same decisions as their neighbors because
the performance of their neighbors’ past decisions suggested that it
was superior. Thus, the same decisions are not driven by the desire
to follow the same decision as others but are the result of an attempt
to use all available information on the best decision. Thus, imitation of
decisions is merely the result of this desire to find the optimal decision,
not the end of the agents.
VI. CONCLUSION
We have evaluated a model in which agents make decisions with
a variant of the CBDT using their own past experience and the
experience of other agents they are interacting with. As we evaluated a
number of scenarios in which different rules were applied to determine
the successful outcome, we established that for learning of the best
decision to occur, agents must have a sufficient large number of in-
teractions, and the information an agent receives from his interactions
must be sufficiently independent. If these conditions are not met, no
learning will be observed. In the absence of a best decision, the attempt
to learn this nonexisting best decision can give rise to widespread and
prolonged herding. This herding is particularly prominent and long
lasting in cases where there are many interactions and the memory of
individuals for past experiences is long.
While we are able to demonstrate some conditions under which
learning can take place and evaluate the conditions under which
herding will emerge, future research will have to provide more detailed
explorations of the role the interactions are playing in this process
by, e.g., investigating the role of the network structure underlying the
interactions, particularly in light of the results in [17], which shows
that the network structure affects learning. Furthermore, the location
of the phase transition and the influence of the memory on this point
need to be much more precisely determined. It would finally be of
interest to investigate the properties of scenarios producing herding to
see whether they generate realistic time series.
Finally, our model does not allow learning from hypothetical cases,
e.g., if a “buy” decision did generate an outcome of “failure,” the
decision maker does not conclude that a “sell” decision would have
generated an outcome of “success” and uses this to adjust the value
function. The use of such hypothetical cases would change the value
function and, thus, might have an impact on the outcomes reported
here. The results in [13] and [14] suggest that with additional infor-
mation, e.g., on the demand structure, learning can be achieved. Our
results suggest that such additional information seems to be critical for
learning to occur. Whether the use of hypothetical cases, which would
allow generating relative frequencies of successes and failures as used
in [14], would have a similar effect on learning is an aspect of the
model that could be addressed in future research.
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